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openvt -u could authenticate a privileged login using TTY device ownership instead of process ownership

kbd (openvt) · AI involvement attributed to AISLE AI-native analyzer (specific model/version not disclosed)

Finding and attribution

In a non-default privileged kbrequest/init configuration that invokes openvt -u, the process-owner check follows /proc/<pid>/fd/0 to the TTY device. If TTY ownership has returned to root while an unprivileged process retains that descriptor, openvt can mistake the process for the console owner and start a passwordless root login. Red Hat says this configuration and timing condition are absent from standard deployments.

Product: kbd (openvt). AI system: AISLE AI-native analyzer (specific model/version not disclosed). Team / organization: AISLE in partnership with Red Hat.

CVE identifiers: CVE-2026-72693.

AI and human contribution (source account): AISLE’s itemized case page says “Discovered by AISLE”; Red Hat’s CNA record credits discovery to Found by AISLE in partnership with Red Hat. The particular model and division of human and model work are not disclosed.

Human involvement is only described where the source account establishes it; unknown involvement does not mean none. Vendor confirmation of a flaw does not confirm every claim about AI contribution.

Discovery context: The AISLE page and Red Hat CNA record publish the vulnerability on August 11, 2026. The AISLE page currently shows the finder credit but also an Updated date of September 15; the sources do not establish when the credit first appeared, so the public AI-attribution date is left unknown. This case requires the documented privileged kbrequest/init use of openvt -u and a TTY ownership timing condition; it is not presented as affecting standard deployments.

Remediation status: fix documented. The upstream kbd commit 78d5ae1 requires both matching process ownership and controlling terminal, rejects root as a pre-authenticated target, and documents the constraint. Red Hat lists fixed errata for several product branches; do not infer that every downstream installation has deployed a fix. Until fixed, Red Hat recommends avoiding openvt -u in privileged kbrequest/init setups or disabling that binding.

A source-documented fix does not establish installed patches or current safety. Source checking does not independently reproduce the finding or establish observed exploitation.

Disclosed 11 Aug 2026. AI attribution date not established by the source. Sources checked 15 Nov 2026; these are separate dates, not a live installation check.

Recorded CVSS: High · highest recorded score 7.8. Documented technical effects: privilege escalation.

Severity, consequences and exploitation evidence

Case grouping uses the highest recorded CVSS score, with its version-specific severity band. It is descriptive, not a combined or editorial risk index. All recorded assessments remain below; scores from different versions and sources may disagree. CVSS specifications define version-specific scoring and severity bands.

CVE-2026-72693: privilege escalation.
Prerequisites / affected scope: The CNA description states: `openvt -u` is intended to identify the owner of the current VT and then execute `login` as that user from a privileged context. In the documented `kbrequest`/init usage, the ownership test in `authenticate_user()` relies on `stat("/proc/ /fd/0")`. `stat()` on `/proc/ /fd/0` follows the symlink to the underlying TTY device node. As a result, `buf.st_uid` reflects the owner of the TTY node rather than the owner of the process holding the file descriptor. If the TTY owner returns to `root` or the getty owner after logout while an unprivileged process still has `fd 0` attached to that TTY, the check can incorrectly treat that process as belonging to the privileged console owner. Once that check succeeds, the `-u` path executes a passwordless login as the selected user. In the documented `kbrequest`/init deployment using `openvt -us`, this can result in passwordless `login -f root` on the spawned VT. This report establishes that privilege escalation path for that documented deployment; it does not claim equivalent reachability for deployments that do not use `openvt -u` from a privileged `kbrequest`/init path..
Exploitation evidence: Exploitation in the wild is not established by the cited description.. Impact source · checked 16 Nov 2026.

Documented fix: The upstream kbd commit 78d5ae1 requires both matching process ownership and controlling terminal, rejects root as a pre-authenticated target, and documents the constraint. Red Hat lists fixed errata for several product branches; do not infer that every downstream installation has deployed a fix. Until fixed, Red Hat recommends avoiding openvt -u in privileged kbrequest/init setups or disabling that binding.

Original evidence

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