Finding and attribution
When both admin and phone-number plugins are used, a non-full-admin role with user:update can set its own phone number on another account and mark it verified. The attacker can then use phone OTP to obtain that account’s session, including a more privileged account. Full-admin-only deployments are not affected.
Product: better-auth. AI system: Anthropic OSS Scanner. Team / organization: Anthropic.
CVE identifiers: Not established in the cited evidence.
AI and human contribution (source account): Discovered by Anthropic’s OSS Scanner, ANT-2026-938BEJ5J.
Human involvement is only described where the source account establishes it; unknown involvement does not mean none. Vendor confirmation of a flaw does not confirm every claim about AI contribution.
Discovery context: The vulnerability is documented as a public disclosure; the source does not establish prior defender knowledge or exploitation.
Remediation status: fix documented. Upgrade better-auth to 1.7.16 or 1.8.0-beta.5. Updates to phoneNumber or phoneNumberVerified now require user:set-phone; custom access-control roles must grant that permission where appropriate.
A source-documented fix does not establish installed patches or current safety. Source checking does not independently reproduce the finding or establish observed exploitation.
Disclosed 3 Nov 2026. AI attribution dated 3 Nov 2026. Sources checked 16 Nov 2026; these are separate dates, not a live installation check.
Recorded CVSS: Not available · no assessment established here. Documented technical effects: authentication bypass.
Severity, consequences and exploitation evidence
Case grouping uses the highest recorded CVSS score, with its version-specific severity band. It is descriptive, not a combined or editorial risk index. All recorded assessments remain below; scores from different versions and sources may disagree. CVSS specifications define version-specific scoring and severity bands.
No source-backed CVSS assessment is established in this catalog.
Case-level evidence: authentication bypass.
Prerequisites / affected scope: Both admin and phone-number plugins are enabled; a non-full-admin role has user:update; attacker can use phone OTP after changing the target number..
Exploitation evidence: No observed exploitation is reported.. Impact source · checked 16 Nov 2026.
Documented fix: Upgrade better-auth to 1.7.16 or 1.8.0-beta.5. Updates to phoneNumber or phoneNumberVerified now require user:set-phone; custom access-control roles must grant that permission where appropriate.