Finding and attribution
After maintainer authorization, the release workflow checks out a mutable pull-request ref and runs pull-request-controlled scripts with a write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing the author to race an update into the job.
Product: mongodb-js/kerberos release_notes GitHub Actions workflow. AI system: GitHub Security Lab AI agent (system not named in advisory). Team / organization: GitHub Security Lab.
CVE identifiers: Not established in the cited evidence.
AI and human contribution (source account): GHSL’s primary AI-agent index includes this advisory in its AI-discovered list. The item advisory credits only Jaroslav Lobačevski and does not describe an agent’s role; attribution is index-level only.
Human involvement is only described where the source account establishes it; unknown involvement does not mean none. Vendor confirmation of a flaw does not confirm every claim about AI contribution.
Discovery context: The advisory documents the race and fixes; it does not claim exploitation in the wild.
Remediation status: fix documented. Fixed in PR #351 on 2026-09-03. A maintainer must trigger the workflow; branch protection may restrict writes.
A source-documented fix does not establish installed patches or current safety. Source checking does not independently reproduce the finding or establish observed exploitation.
Disclosed 16 Sep 2026. AI attribution dated 16 Sep 2026. Sources checked 14 Nov 2026; these are separate dates, not a live installation check.
Recorded CVSS: Not available · no assessment established here. Documented technical effects: code execution, data modification.
Severity, consequences and exploitation evidence
Case grouping uses the highest recorded CVSS score, with its version-specific severity band. It is descriptive, not a combined or editorial risk index. All recorded assessments remain below; scores from different versions and sources may disagree. CVSS specifications define version-specific scoring and severity bands.
No source-backed CVSS assessment is established in this catalog.
Case-level evidence: code execution, data modification.
Prerequisites / affected scope: An external pull request author can update the mutable head ref after maintainer authorization and cause attacker code to run in a workflow with contents:write and pull-requests:write token permissions..
Exploitation evidence: Exploitation in the wild is not established by the cited description.. Impact source · checked 16 Nov 2026.
Documented fix: Fixed in PR #351 on 2026-09-03. A maintainer must trigger the workflow; branch protection may restrict writes.