Finding and attribution
The marimo test-release workflow compared second-precision timestamps with a strict greater-than check, allowing a same-second pull-request update after authorization to be checked out, executed and passed to privileged package-publishing jobs.
Product: marimo-team/marimo GitHub Actions. AI system: GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent. Team / organization: GitHub Security Lab.
CVE identifiers: Not established in the cited evidence.
AI and human contribution (source account): GHSL’s primary AI-agent index includes this advisory in its list of findings discovered with AI agents. The individual advisory credits the GHSL human reporter but does not identify the agent or its contribution; specific AI workflow is therefore not documented at item level. Reported 2026-09-04 and workflow deleted 2026-09-08.
Human involvement is only described where the source account establishes it; unknown involvement does not mean none. Vendor confirmation of a flaw does not confirm every claim about AI contribution.
Discovery context: The cited sources document the finding and remediation; they do not claim exploitation in the wild.
Remediation status: fix documented. The vulnerable workflow was deleted in PR #10765 on 2026-09-08. Exploitation requires winning a same-second race and an authorized maintainer trigger; downstream publishing exposure depends on the workflow setup.
A source-documented fix does not establish installed patches or current safety. Source checking does not independently reproduce the finding or establish observed exploitation.
Disclosed 16 Sep 2026. AI attribution dated 16 Sep 2026. Sources checked 14 Nov 2026; these are separate dates, not a live installation check.
Recorded CVSS: Not available · no assessment established here. Documented technical effects: code execution.
Severity, consequences and exploitation evidence
Case grouping uses the highest recorded CVSS score, with its version-specific severity band. It is descriptive, not a combined or editorial risk index. All recorded assessments remain below; scores from different versions and sources may disagree. CVSS specifications define version-specific scoring and severity bands.
No source-backed CVSS assessment is established in this catalog.
Case-level evidence: code execution.
Prerequisites / affected scope: A same-second update to a pull request can pass the test-release authorization check, then be checked out and executed in the privileged package-publishing workflow. The report establishes workflow code execution; do not infer a package artifact compromise unless that result is separately documented..
Exploitation evidence: The cited source does not establish exploitation in the wild.. Impact source · checked 16 Nov 2026.
Documented fix: The vulnerable workflow was deleted in PR #10765 on 2026-09-08. Exploitation requires winning a same-second race and an authorized maintainer trigger; downstream publishing exposure depends on the workflow setup.